URBAN FRINGES AS URBAN LABORATORIES

THE INEFFICIENCY OF VILLE SANS BIDONVILLES PROGRAM AND THE NEW VISION OF THE DOUARS, IN MARRAKECH

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POLITECNICO DI MILANO
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PROF. GABRIELE PISQUICI, SIMONETTA ARMONDI

GROUP 01
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### PART 3. VILLES SANS BIDONVILLES PROGRAM

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- 3.1.1 Dynamics of spontaneous urbanization: slums and the unregulated residential districts
- 3.1.2 Public authorities between prohibition and tolerance
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### CAN THE SLUMS BE AN EXEMPLARY FORM FOR URBAN PLANNING?

A NEW VISION OF THE DOUAR, FROM “SLUMDOG CITY” TO AN URBAN LABORATORY

### BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SITOGRAPHY
All the stories about the slums immerse us in muddy, damp streets, where architecture is essential, the houses are built with waste materials. Food is scarce, but diseases are numerous. The slums are synonymous with extreme poverty, a reflection of these peasants, worn out by their fruitless lands, who have come to break their last strength against the impenetrable gates of the city.

For several years, however, these assumptions have tended to disappear. Faced with the human and social emergency that may have reigned in marginal urban areas, solutions had to be found.

For urban planners and architects, slums have become urban opportunities, laboratories for the city of tomorrow. In these chaotic areas of high urban density, we experiment, we look for urban models, with the only constraint, simplicity.

In these urban margins we have nothing more to lose, so we can build everything.

If our urban planners and architects seek and explore innovative solutions to respond to these extremely precarious situations, “are we now ready to see our slums as an opportunity and an opportunity for an urban laboratory at home?”

If the image of slums is associated with negative feelings, this relationship now tends to evolve. We talk more and more about these urban fringes as urban laboratories. Faced with the urgency of certain situations, solutions have been found, inventing new forms of urban organisation. While many observers in the city have already explored the issue, a new study reminds us of the potential wealth of these slums.

The planetary dynamic of urbanization passes through the expansion of shanty-towns in developing countries. Today, 930,000 people, or one eighth of humanity, live in these marginal spaces. Tomorrow, in 2030, they will represent 2 billion people. While some see these spaces as a threat, others see them as a potential, even a wealth from which we should be inspired.

For various reasons, the urban model developed in the heart of the slums would be an example of a sustainable city. Indeed, the inhabitants move on foot, due to the lack of infrastructure large enough to accommodate the motor vehicles’ passage. Children
play in the streets. In these overcrowded spaces, the challenges of urban density have long been in the process of being resolved. Like small houses, buildings are optimised and living spaces are adaptable and multifunctional. Public spaces are genuinely public and for everyone. In the slums of Marrakech people get married on the street, with their neighbours. For lack of public services, they clean in front of their houses. The intensity of this city is linked to the porosity between public and private spaces. When something breaks, they repair it (there is a strong logic of recycling). Mutual aid systems are developed. Local economies are being created, so that today these slums generate money. Therefore these spaces are therefore increasingly perceived as a sustainable city, at the same time pedestrian, ecological, participatory and recyclable.

We understand that specific social or ethical rules prevent us from allowing these camps to settle culturally and legally, and choosing not to accept that this precariousness is a city model. A praiseworthy and understandable approach. In general, the slum has always been equated with the instability of developing countries. However, the influx of migrant populations causes a displacement of these forms of settlement. While these forms have long been transit structures, today they tend to become perennial forms of organisation. So we choose to destroy, for various reasons, which poses a problem of ownership.

We understand that certain social or ethical rules prevent us culturally and legally from allowing these camps to settle. However, if you think about it, the slum model, if it gives us the keys to the development of sustainable cities, seems like a model we know in another form. Like the ephemeral city, the slum could become an opportunity. An opportunity to redefine together the codes of the city of tomorrow. An opportunity, in the crisis, to create together and humanly a revolution. An opportunity to highlight urban and social potential for collective innovation and better living, in the creation of an urban planning of simplicity. In the same way as ephemeral urbanism, this new form of urbanism could become a laboratory of the city from below, of the city made by and for the inhabitants.
Glossary

A

Authoritarian Regime
Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms.

B

Bidonville
Directly translated to “Tin-can cities”, the name given to informally built communities in Morocco.

Buffer Zone
A buffer zone is generally a zonal area that lies between two or more areas, but depending on the type of buffer zone, it may serve to separate regions or conjoin them.

Cluster
A group of similar things positioned or occurring closely together.

Communal
Living together (families), not defined by ownership. Apartment block typology may be considered communal.

Colonization
The action or process of settling among and establishing control over the indigenous people of an area.

Deterioration
A gradual decline, as in quality, serviceability, or vigor.

Douars
Spontaneous towns; semi-urban or semi-rural habitats.

Double Urbanization
Process for which within the city an urbanization process is defined for specific areas.

Exodus
Internal migration from farmlands to the city and douars due to the potential benefits.

Experimental Ground for Planning
Definition given to the country of Morocco and the city of Marrakech due to their high potential in terms of political and cultural capabilities, in particular due to the raw state of the urban planning system.

F

Formality
Short paragraph explaining the use of the word ‘FFF’ in the Moroccan context compared to the use in the Eurocentric context.

Gray Spaces
Those positioned between the whiteness of legality/approval/safety and the blackness of eviction/destruction/death (According to Yiftachel 2009)

H

Hammam
A type of steam bath or a place of public bathing

Heritage
Short paragraph explaining the use of the word ‘Heritage’ in the Moroccan context compared to the use in the Eurocentric context.

Incidental Space
Short paragraph explaining the use of the word ‘incidental space’ in the Moroccan context compared to the use in the Eurocentric context.

Independence
Condition of country or state in which its residents and population exercise self-government, and usually sovereignty, over its territory.

Influence
Exogenous actions towards the culture, rules and polices of the city.

Informal
Something that is not officially recognized or declared, as well as organized and controlled by an official institution.

Informality
Absence of formality.

Madrasa
Arabic word for any type of educational institution, secular or religious (of any religion), whether for elementary instruction or higher learning.

Marginalisation
Treatment of a person, group, or concept as insignificant or peripheral.

Medina
The name given to city centres in Arabic cities. In the context of this report we refer to the Marrakech Medina as ‘Medina’.

Migration
Movement of people from one place to another with intentions of settling, permanently or temporarily, at a new location.

Modus Operandi
A method of procedure.

Multifaceted
(City)
Referred to something or someone that has different features or aspects; in this case, the city defined as “a crossroad of different cultures”
OVERPOPULATION
Overpopulation occurs when a species' population exceeds the carrying capacity of its ecological niche. It can result from an increase in births, a decline in the mortality rate, an increase in immigration, or an unsustainable biome and depletion of resources.

PRIVATE
Ownership and living are private. Closed off to interaction.

PERIPHERIES
1. The outermost boundary of an area. 2. The outside surface of something. The term can be used considering both the physical or the social aspect.

PROTECTORATE
Colonial regime imposed by France in the Sherifian Empire on Morocco.

QIBLA
The qibla is the direction towards the Kaaba in the Sacred Mosque in Mecca.

RED CITY
Commonly known name for the city of Marrakech, due to the peculiar colors of most of the buildings in the historical areas.

RURAL EXODUS
The migratory pattern of peoples from rural areas into urban areas.

SELF-ORGANIZATION
Spontaneous order, is a process where some form of overall order arises from local interactions between parts of an initially disordered system.

SLUM
A slum is usually a highly populated urban residential area consisting mostly of closely packed, decrepit housing units in a situation of deteriorated or incomplete infrastructure, inhabited primarily by impoverished persons.

SLURBS
a suburb of wearily uniform and usually poor constructed houses (Webber, 1963)

SOUK
Permanently enclosed marketplace or street where goods and services are exchanged or sold.

SUBURB
An area on the edge of a large town or city where people who work in the town or city often live.

TENSION
T. Parsons defines "tension" as a tendency to disequilibrium in the balance of exchange between two or more components of the system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>Agency for Social development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>French development Agency.</td>
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<td>ANHI</td>
<td>National Agency for Substandard Housing</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Accompagnment social</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODI</td>
<td>Community Organizations Development Institute</td>
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<td>ERAC</td>
<td>Regional Enstablishment for Management and Construction.</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euros</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBPMC</td>
<td>Fondation Banque Populaire for Micro-credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMBA</td>
<td>French Moroccan Building Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOGARIM</td>
<td>Moroccan Loan Guarantee Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONDEP</td>
<td>Foundation for the Development and Local Micro Credit Partnership</td>
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<td>FSH</td>
<td>Social Housing Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Habitat Clandestine (Informal Housing)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INAU</td>
<td>National Institute for Urban Management</td>
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<td>INDH</td>
<td>National Initiative for Human Development</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Moroccan Dirham</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Milennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North African</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIF</td>
<td>Moroccan Infrastructure fund</td>
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<td>PARHI</td>
<td>National Program for rehousing and Management of Housing</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>QIZ</td>
<td>Qualified Industrial Zone</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustmenet Program</td>
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<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small to Meium-sized Enterprises</td>
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<td>SWF</td>
<td>Sovereign Wealth fund</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United nations</td>
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<td>UNFP</td>
<td>Union Nationale des Forces Populaires</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>US dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSB</td>
<td>Ville Sans Bidonvilles</td>
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<td>VSBP</td>
<td>Ville Sans Bidonvilles Program</td>
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Within the framework of the Thematic Studio held by prof. L. Montedoro at Politecnico di Milano - where the urban fabric focuses of our attention is the Moroccan country and specifically the **multifaced city** of Marrakech, for the investigation of the Research Thematic Seminar we decided to conduct a parallel and more in depth analysis on the socio-spatial context and conflicts of the city.

Since the preliminary historical analysis, which will follow, we immediately identified some potential conflicts between different urban and extra-urban actors concerning the urban development of the city. Due to the peculiarity of exogenous influences of which Marrakech is influenced, it was evident how even the urban structure had some side-effects on it.

In particular, we decided to focus on those parts of the urban fabric commonly identified as *slums*, or in a context-wise word, the *douars*. A space to live for a specific population, with specific non-rules and environments which propose a direct discussion and conflict with the more outstanding management and plan; it is not only a spatial conflict, but also a social conflict which gets roots in the programmatic intervention of *Villes sans bidonvilles* promoted by the government itself, a program which should be straight-forward and looking at the future, but that maybe is just a vector which is intensifying an already existing dualism.

The research question focused precisely on this program of intervention, its causes and effects and the potential conflicts and the resolution it can, or should take.

But is it really the answer?

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1. The definition has been given by the studio due to the characteristics of having a multicultural and multidimension approach and dynamics within the social conditions of the city.
“Across a filthy, rubbish-filled creek we enter the slum’s heaving residential area, treading carefully to ensure we don’t step in human sewage. Live wires hang from wobbly walls; we crouch through corridor-like passages between houses made from reclaimed rubble as the sky disappears above our heads.

Behind flimsy doorway curtains we spy babies sleeping on dirty mattresses in tiny single room homes, mothers busy washing, cooking and cleaning. The few hours I spend touring Mumbai’s teeming Dharavi slum are uncomfortable and upsetting, teetering on voyeuristic. They are also among the most uplifting of my life. Instead of a neighbourhood characterised by misery, I find a bustling and enterprising place, packed with small-scale industries defying their circumstances to flourish amidst the squalor. Rather than pity, I am inspired by man’s alchemic ability to thrive when the chips are down”.

This extract comes from a quote in Ananya Roy’s article “Slumdog Cities”. It is an intervention on the epistemological and methodologies of urban studies, in which she tries to understand and transform how cities in the South of the world are studied and represented in urban research and, to a certain extent, in popular discourse.

As such, the article deals primarily with a formation of ideas - “subaltern urbanism” - that undertakes the theorizing of the megalopolis and its subaltern spaces and subaltern classes.

Of these, the omnipresent “shanty-town” is the most important. Writing against the apocalyptic and dystopian narratives of the slum, subaltern urbanism provides accounts of the slum as dwelling ground, sustenance, self-organization and politics.

This is a vital and even radical challenge to the dominant narratives of the megalopolis and, for these reasons, we think that this approach is the right one to adopt in the analysis of the slums of Marrakech.
After defining the starting point and the approach to be used, we then explained and described a research methodology. Based not only on Roy’s publication, we drew on other articles and books, more or less recent. Despite the different scale and contexts of analysis of the various articles (some more focused on the North African area, others on the global cities of the South), it turned out to be interesting how, through different methodologies and considerations made, we arrived at the same result, or rather, at the same final question: is it correct to continue to associate shanty-towns with unhealthy and dangerous places, or can we consider them as a new prototype of cities?

Alternative urban spaces in the civic, private and public spheres emerge in response to the significant challenges facing urban actors today. Labour markets are changing rapidly, the availability of affordable housing is under increasing pressure and public spaces have become the battleground of urban policy.

This revised collection brings together contributors to trigger an international dialogue on the production of alternative urban spaces through a triple exploration of alternative spaces for work, housing and public life.

By searching and examining existing alternative urban spaces, the authors identify elements that offer opportunities to create radically different futures for the world’s urban spaces.

Informal practices and structures characterize these new systems of cities. Broadly defined as ‘ways of getting things done’, these informal yet powerful practices tend to escape articulation in official discourse. We have identified unique research into such practices across area and across discipline, which charts the grey zones and blurred boundaries, and distinguished types of ambivalence and contexts of complexity.

The informal practices revealed include emotion-driven exchanges, value-based practices of solidarity and belonging enacting multiple identities, interest-driven know-how and power-driven forms of co-optation and control.

The paradox of the invisibility of these informal practices is their ubiquity.
OVERLOOK ON THE CITY OF MARRAKECH

2.1. GENERAL CONTEXT

Marrakech is the capital of the mid-southwestern region of Marrakech-Safi and it is the fourth largest city in Morocco with 840,000 inhabitants. Located in the Southern part of Morocco, in between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, it lays at the foot of the Great Atlas Mountains and on an affluent of the Tensift river.

It is a city in constant change, a rapidly growing environment more than any other one in the kingdom: this phenomenon was originated because of a migratory flux in the peripheral suburbs that contributed to its expansion during the time. Consequently, the population grew rapidly and subsequently there was a lack and a high demand of land, that the planning authorities were not able to manage. This absence of urban policies and adequate interventions have soon turned the city as a subject of experiments to plan, control and manage the process of urbanization; the only urban policies were focused primarily on the countryside and on the development of the rural areas, slowing down the rural-to-urban exodus (the state intervention in the urban areas was more centred on emergency operations, favouring the upper social categories that could afford housing-credit).

This led, after the independence, to a social and spatial diversity; in fact in the urban environment it is possible to recognize four residential areas that represent different forms of state intervention, morphology and social composition: the old town (Medina); the douars; the European city; the extension after the independence.

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Dynasties and religious movements come and go, including the Almoravid movement at its peak controlled Morocco and parts of present-day Algeria and Spain.

Morocco becomes a French protectorate under the Treaty of Fez, administered by French Resident-General.

End of French protectorate after unrest and strong nationalist sentiment.

Ville Nouvelle enlargement plan

Rural-Urban Exodus

Reform of Municipalities and Urban development

Last urban plan

Start the Second Urbanization

2.1.1 Built environment

The ancient section of the city, known as the Medina, is called the "red city" because of its buildings, ramparts, mosques, gardens, and palaces of beaten clay. The architectural influence of the Almohads was strong and featured carved domes and arches, when blended with influences from the Sahara and West Africa, it created a unique style of architecture in the city.

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As a consequence, the population has grown rapidly and subsequently, there was a lack and a high demand for land, that the planning authorities were not able to manage. This absence of urban policies and adequate interventions have soon turned the city as a subject of experiments to plan, control and manage the process of urbanization; the only urban policies were focused primarily on the countryside and on the development of the rural areas, slowing down the rural-to-urban exodus (the state intervention in the urban areas was more centred on emergency operations, favouring the upper social categories that could afford housing-credit). This led, after the independence, to a social and spatial diversity; in fact in the urban environment it is possible to recognize four residential areas that represent different forms of state intervention, morphology and social composition: the old town (Medina); the douars; the European city; the extension after the independence.

Marrakech was founded in 1062 by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfin who instituted in this territory a qaṣba as the seat of Al-Moravides dynasty (Sunnite). The first buildings that were created inside the city were dedicated to Islamic religious schools and two mosques, the Almohad one and the minaret of Koutubia. The Medina represents the original nucleus of the city, a walled enclosure environment of 10 km length and of 700 hectares of surface. It was destroyed in 1147 by the Almohads (Shi’ites) and its enclosure was enlarged. It is characterized by an irregular medieval plan that originated consequently based on a series of meeting places, like mosques, madrasa (Islamic schools) and large squares, like Jemaa El-Fna (the most famous one). In the origin it was conceived as a concentration of homogeneous and residential neighbourhoods, but soon the population started growing and it resulted as an over-densified settlement which led to a deterioration of open spaces. The creation of an industrial zone outside the Medina attracted large flows of workers from the surrounding rural areas; but this phenomenon also gave birth to the peripheral douars surrounding the walls.

In 1912, the French Protectorate in Morocco imposed a colonial regime in Morocco, through occupation by the military army. The city of Marrakech, in the same years, started to extend beyond its walls to the west side following a European/modern style of planning: it acquired new, very distinct features from the Medina because it was mainly structured with villas and higher buildings, creating a new hybrid architecture with mixed elements from European and Asian tradition then known as ‘modern Moroccan’. In the meantime, the district of Sidi Youssef Ben Ali, originally part of the Medina, started expanding towards South and beyond the city walls following the same urban and traditional architectural features; but soon it became a marginal area deprived of any infrastructural facilities. Nowadays it is the largest district after the Medina; it is possible to distinguish two urban and architectural parts completely different: the first one can be considered unplanned or spontaneous, because it is featured by the traditional housing and it hosts the impoverished population; the second one follows the contemporary urban planning rules, with buildings that offers normal living conditions.

This district is the foremost example of the ‘overspill of the Medina’ that caused small, spontaneous towns known as douars all around the ancient city walls. These small towns were created before the public authorities could intervene and soon, they became unhealthy environments. This fact is due to the situation of a housing shortage in the old town and it consequently gave origin to a creation of illegal estates, mainly between 1930 and 1950; in fact, the housing crisis has been the protagonist phenomenon for over half a century in Marrakech. The lack of decent homes was increasing due to the fact that 50% of the population was concentrated in the 5% of the surface of the city, mainly in Medina and in the previous mentioned neighbourhood of Sidi Youssef Ben Ali. The rise in the prices of housing and building plots caused a shortage of social housing and, as a consequence, the proliferation of slums.
fig. 3.6. Marrakech in 1844. The city is developed inside the City’ Walls.

fig. 3.7. Marrakech in the 20's. With the French Protectorate there is the construction of a new part of the city outside the Medina' Walls, called “Ville Nouvelle”.

fig. 3.8. Comparison between the old settlement of Marrakech and the one influenced by European urban planning project.
Marrakech Urban fabric between green spaces, residential areas and infrastructures

FIG. 14
These new districts **didn't have a specific planning legislation**: they originated from the countryside and they have developed a new type of habitat, classified as semi-urban or semi-rural, according to the traditional Arab-Muslim habitat model.

After the independence in 1956 from the French colonization, the urban morphology of Marrakech changed as well as the social organization: it soon assumed a more complex and mixed urban structure, so that it was difficult to distinguish the traditional from the modern, in order to better respond to the increasing requirements of the contemporary urban life. This new reorganization followed the trend of reconstruction started during the colonial period and it was inspired by the French architect and planner Ecchord: he continued the Western-European style of expansion of Marrakech, focused on very regular and less dense built space, with wide lanes and equipped with modern and functional infrastructure.

These new parts soon became the territory of large foreign investments in tourism, mainly composed by hotels and luxury residences that contributed to attract a large number of people for visiting and touring the city; this phenomenon transformed Marrakech in a cosmopolitan city. But on the other side there are still deteriorated parts, mainly in the Medina, that are unlinked with these new settlements because of an inefficient infrastructure and a problematic situation of traffic congestion, as well as social issues. This duality is also due to the absence of an effective intervention by the state: the mentioned-above intervention from abroad and the 'imported' planning models, as well as their direct application without a minimum adaptation, have resulted in failures.

In Marrakech, but more generally in Morocco, most Moroccans profess Islam, almost all of them the Sunni Islam and only a small minority of the Shiite Islam. In addition to Muslims in Morocco there are about 80,000 Christians, mostly French Catholics, and 8,000 Jews.

It was the Islamic culture, based on the shari’ah foundation, that influenced the morphology of cities starting from the private space up to the public one.

Everything in the Arab-Muslim city is ordered around places of worship, the “Great Mosque” and the small ones that characterize the residential neighbourhoods. It can be said that since the advent of Islam, they were introduced principles and conditions also in the way of building and then for their use constant over time they became rules and laws.

These principles also influenced the way of organizing city, houses and infrastructures, directing the urban structure growth towards the current appearance and shapes. Therefore, brotherhood and family’s religious values influenced the morphology of the space, making it unique and utterly different from what the Western world is. Islam has provided these principles, based on shari’ah1, that have influenced the way of life of Muslim communities and individuals and the urban environment and the social organization. As the family is the most fundamental element of Muslim society, the fundamental environment of Islamic culture is the home (Sakan), which requires detailed consideration in terms of design and planning in order to obtain a better place to live and which follows the religious rules. It should be the product of Islamic beliefs following the guiding principles such as privacy, cleanliness, security, segregation, waste, home interior decoration and many more.

The organization of domestic architectural spaces are thought to be close to each other and with a multifunctional space surrounding an internal courtyard. Urban areas’ planning proceeds from the privacy of the inside of the household to the more public urban areas. These buildings consequently appear introverted, directly facing inward.

As a result the street, unlike the western conception, becomes mainly a device for physically accessing the entrance to the house, making it a narrow and residual space and often covered with buildings from the first floor onwards, called sabbat, thus generating corridor configurations called derbs. Therefore, the Islamic city is configured as a tripartite system of public, semi-public, and private spaces, which vary in degree of accessibility and enclosure.

To a foreigner, the streets and alleys would look like amaze of featureless cul-de-sacs, but are in reality coded with a subtle, complex visual reference system of thresholds, transition zones, and buffer spaces which act collectively as filters to keep strangers out. Therefore, the ultimate function of streets within the quarter was to restrict mobility rather than facilitate it. In this process, Shari’ah has influenced almost all aspects of the city’s physical environment, making the separation between the public sphere and the family. The sanctum is the structuring principles of Islamic urbanism. The foundations of religion can be found in every single settlement unit with varying degrees of complexity.

The width and the hierarchy of the streets is conditioned by the organization of the religious and residential centre. The underpasses are the direct result of the Fina. As well as the overhangs (Mashrabia), on the streets on the upper floors. The almost total absence of windows on the lower floors and their minimal size gives a uniform character to the street façades and does not help with orientation. The irregular structure of the buildings within the district, which has not been planned, is the result of the agreement between the owners of the houses in the district itself. Although this irregularity seems structurally incomprehensible, from the point of view of the organization of family
life they are perfectly logical.

As we said the house, the most private space in the city, can have a public dimension and in some cases, it can become almost entirely public, for example on celebrations. In fact, the term public space refers both to a spatial dimension and to a social one, as a space of relationship, dedicated to human relations. The streets and alleys of the qasba, public places, can be almost private and become places closed to the public at certain times of the day. Squares, alleys, gardens, and spaces in general important within the Arab-Islamic city are public places by definition, but this public is able to blur: it can become private and familiar.

Even the arrangement of activities within the city is conditioned by rules directly derived from the Koran. The mosque, the fulcrum of the religious sphere, must always have the mirhab wall facing Mecca and must be present in every nucleus of houses. Its arrangement orients the sense and formation of the neighbourhood, or the core of houses in which it is located. It is precisely the strong presence of the religious sphere that strongly influences the urban morphology, which differs a lot from that of the Western world but for this reason assumes a substantial cultural value.
2.1.2 How Demographic and Social Dynamics

In 2020, the population of Marrakech overtook 1 million of inhabitants with a 1.42% increase from 2019. The sharp increase of the people growing between 1950 and 2020 from 209,000 to 1,003,000 people, and the statistic is talking about reaching the 1,267,000 people in 2035.1 Those relevant data allow us to understand the rise of the population density in an urban tissue that didn’t develop as fast as his inhabitants.

On the other side, there is a large part of the population struggling with problems of insecure incomes and insolvency, indeed, 60% of the households have meagre incomes that do not allow them to access the housing market. Besides, the 50% of the inhabitants are concentrated only in 5% of the territory of Marrakech, mainly in the Medina and the Sidi Youssef Ben Ali neighbourhood.

**FIG. 16**

MARRAKECH URBAN AREA POPULATION GRAPH

TOTAL POPULATION
FIG. 17

POPULATION in 2004

TASSOULTANTE

MEDINA

GUELIZ

MECHOUAR KASBA

SAADA

HARBIL

ANNAHKIL

SIDI YOUSSEF BEN ALI

OUAHAT SIDI BRAHIM

OUAHAT SIDI BRAHIM

ALOUIDANE

SAADA

MENARA
2.2 HISTORY OF THE CITY

2.2.1 The Urban development of the city

Marrakech was founded in 1062 by Yusuf ibn Tashfin who instituted in this territory a qasba as the seat of Al-Moravides dynasty (Sunnite). The first buildings inside the city were dedicated to Islamic religious schools and two mosques, the Almohad one and the minaret of Koutubia. The Medina represents the city’s original nucleus, a walled enclosure environment of 10 km length and 700 hectares of surface. It was destroyed in 1147 by the Almohads (Shi‘ites), and its enclosure was enlarged. It is characterized by an irregular medieval plan that originated based on a series of meeting places, like mosques, madrasa (Islamic schools) and large squares, like Jemaa El-Fna (the most famous one). In origin, it was conceived as a concentration of homogeneous and residential neighborhoods. Still, soon the population started growing, and it resulted as an over-densified settlement which led to a deterioration of open spaces. The creation of an industrial zone outside the Medina attracted large flows of workers from the surrounding rural areas. Still, this phenomenon also gave birth to the peripheral douars surrounding the walls.

In 1912, the French Protectorate in Morocco imposed a colonial regime in Morocco, through occupation by the military army. The city of Marrakech, in the same years, started to extend beyond its walls to the west side following a European/modern style of planning: it acquired new, very distinct features from the Medina because it was mainly structured with villas and higher buildings, creating a new hybrid architecture with mixed elements from European and Asian tradition then known as ‘modern Moroccan’. In the meantime, the district of Sidi Youssef Ben Ali, originally part of the Medina, started expanding towards South and beyond the city walls following the same urban and architectural traditional features; but soon it became a marginal area deprived of any infrastructural facilities.

After the independence in 1956 from the French colonization, the urban morphology of Marrakech changed as well as the social organization: it soon assumed a more complex and mixed urban structure, so that it was difficult to distinguish the traditional from the modern, to better respond to the increasing requirements of the contemporary urban life. This new reorganization followed the trend of reconstruction started during the colonial period and it was inspired by the French architect and planner Ecochard: he continued the Western-European style of expansion of Marrakech, focused on very regular and less dense built space, with wide lanes and equipped with modern and functional infrastructure. The aim was to realize in these territories the project of social pacification, which centered around three key concepts: the ideal of the “association”, that of the “dual city” and that of the “valorization and respect” of the political system and cultural traditions of the “protected” country. In fact, the French colonies must keep and maintain the civilization, the traditions, the social life and the institutions of the existent city.

This urban planning project was based on:
- The idea of preservation and protection of the “traditional” Moroccan areas.
- The creation of a greenbelt around these “native reservations”.
- The design and construction of an ex-novo and elegant Ville Nouvelle conceived for the resident European population.
- A cultural assumption: this neighborhood should be built close enough for contact, but not so close to absorb the native city, keeping the local social realities.

This Moroccan dual city was born of a complex set of understandings regarding the meaning of local/indigenous culture, couched in an apparent attempt to understand these differences between the diverse urban contexts. These new parts soon became the territory of large foreign investments in tourism, mainly composed of hotels and luxury residences that contributed to attract a large amount of people for visiting and touring the city: this phenomenon transformed Marrakech in a cosmopolitan city.

Nowadays, it is possible to distinguish two urban and architectural parts completely different: the first one can be considered unplanned or spontaneous, because it is featured by the traditional housing and it hosts the impoverished population; the second one follows the contemporary urban planning rules, with buildings that offers normal living conditions.

This district is the main example of the phenomenon of the ‘overspill of the Medina’ that caused the creation of small,...
spontaneous towns known as douars all around the walls of the ancient city. These small towns were created before the public authorities could intervene and soon, they became unhealthy environments. This fact is due to a situation of a housing shortage in the old town and it consequently gave origin to a creation of illegal estates (mainly between 1930 and 1950) in fact, housing crisis has been the protagonist phenomenon for over half a century in Marrakech. The lack of decent homes was increasing because the 50% of the population was concentrated in the 5% of the surface of the city, mainly in Medina and in the Sidi Youssef Ben Ali neighborhood. Moreover, those areas have inefficient infrastructure and a problematic situation of traffic congestion, as well as social issues. This duality is also due to the absence of an effective intervention by the state: the mentioned-above intervention from abroad and the ‘imported’ planning models, as well as their direct application without a minimum adaptation, have resulted in failures. ²

In 2020, the population of Marrakech overtakes 1 million of inhabitants with a 1.42% increase from 2019. The sharp increase of the people growing between 1950 and 2020 from 209.000 to 1.003.000 people, and the statistic are talking about to reach 1.267.000 people in 2035. ³ Those relevant data allow us to understand the rise of the density of the population in a urban tissue which didn’t develop as fast as his inhabitants.

On the other side, there is a large part of the population struggling with problems of insecure incomes and insolvency, indeed, the 60% of the households have very low incomes that do not allow them to access to the housing market. In addition, the 50% of the inhabitants is concentrated only in 5% of the territory of Marrakech, mainly in the Medina and the Sidi Youssef Ben Ali neighbourhood. ⁴

2.2.2 How Islam shapes the city

The Islamic culture, based on the Shari’ah foundation, influenced the morphology of cities all around Morocco and Marrakech is part of these cities. Starting from the private space up to the public one everything in the Arab-Muslim city is ordered around places of worship, the “Great Mosque” and the small ones that characterize the residential neighbourhoods.

These principles also influenced the way of organizing city, houses, and infrastructures, directing the growth of the urban structure towards the current appearance and shapes. It was therefore the religious values of brotherhood and family that influenced the morphology of the space, making it unique and completely different from what the Western world is.

Urban areas’ planning proceeds from the privacy of the inside of the household to the more public urban spaces. These buildings consequently appear introverted, directly facing inward. As a result the street, unlike the western conception, becomes mainly a device for physically accessing the entrance to the house, making it a narrow and residual space and often covered with buildings from the first floor onwards, called configured as a tripartite system of public, semi-public, and private spaces, which vary in degree of accessibility and enclosure. ¹

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2.3 DOUARS

2.3.1 Actual conditions, history and development

The history of Marrakech is characterized by periods of great instability and continuous change in the political structure and administration. In the 18th century, attracted by the potential of the African territory, especially of Morocco, it is the time of Colonialism in which the Spanish, French and English divided territories and resources almost peacefully, for which Morocco became a Spanish Protectorate in the north, French from Rabat down, with Tangier declared a neutral and international city. Starting from the second half of the nineteenth century, the European powers began the race to colonize Africa.

In 1920 the Republic of the Rif was self-proclaimed, which had to surrender to France 5 years later. In the second post-war period, numerous independence movements arose in the country, and Sultan Mohammed V was exiled to Madagascar. Morocco achieved independence in 1956, and Mohammed V, returning from confinement, became the ruler of the new kingdom.

After the 2nd World War the struggle for independence begins with the first national liberation movements with revolts and repression, Moroccan Nationalism is born and finally in 1956 Morocco declared and obtained its Independence, one of the first countries in the world to emerge from colonialist hegemony, led by Hassan II from 1956 to 1999.

Since the independence, Marrakech has been an experimentation ground for planning, controlling and managing the processes of urbanization; in particular, the attention of the government fall in the first place towards the urban policies of the countryside, with the idea to develop and fix the rural population and slow down the rural-urban exodus.

On the other hand, economically speaking, the government decided to have the so-called “laissez-faire” polices that allowed the richest population to get richer and richer, including landowners who constituted an important part in the urban development, even though doing it by the creation of several illegal estates, which in part managed to relieve the housing crisis and to establish a new type of territorial structure in Marrakech.

And this is one of the main reasons for formation of the so-called douars, an alternative in response to the housing needs coming from the lack of management and resources.

The inner city has a radio-concentric plan with a peculiar over-densification of the built environment caused by the influence of the first settlers and the introduction of the western capitalistic concept that also caused a partial deterioration of the open space, specifically in the historical center of Medina.

On the other hand, in the outer part, the presence of the industrial area attracted large flows of new entrepreneurs from the rural areas, following a general rural-urban exodus which on the first attempt caused an initial overpopulation and faced a situation of increase in terms of rent and sales fees. In the 1920s, the city of Marrakech started to expand towards the west side and this started to highlight some differences between the unplanned and planned urban space - from which the Informal division between the historical Medina and the “European city” bringing not only a technical and formal division, but social as well. A social and spatial break in the organization of the urban territory was predictable.

Due to the lack of polices and attention from the government, the result was a continuous over-densification of the Medina and a popular overspill towards the douars (small, spontaneous towns): (J. Rocha, J. Duarte, 2007)

The increase of housing demand due to the exodus, the lack of public involvement in the planning processes and the high rental payments were only some of the reasons why the population started to expand the city and to create the douars. This caused a demographic movement to the farmlands.

The birth of these new peripheral douars, according to Mandelur (1972) can actually be considered as the second phase of Marrakech Urbanization process.

During this precarious period (1930-1950) the population of Marrakech started to settle with illegal and provisional housing in both the private and the state-owned fields and throughout these constructions started to increase in terms of dimensions and to gain a certain solidity, even for what concerns the construction techniques.

Due to the informality of these new cities, the government never registered or recognized them, and because of this any official intervention has never been done; on the other hand private landowners were taking advantage of the situation and started to divide the land and provide it to the people in needs.
As recorded by Dr. Adnan Chbebi of Morocco, the douar and bidonvilles dwellings of Marrakech may be classified according to legal status and function into four major types as follows:

**Spontaneous bidonvilles** are informal settlements built in different neighborhoods of the city on abandoned private or government land, often relatively small in size and declining. This type of bidonville generally lacks access to municipal services such as water, sewage, electricity, roads, health services, etc. Despite cross country endeavors to check the predominance of unacceptable lodging, authorities to a great extent decided not to indict such unlawful control of land since no serious social issues are incited.

**Planned bidonvilles** originated as privately owned land, rented out to bidonvilles migrants for an annual rent of 50 to 60 Moroccan Dirham for every 20 square meters of area. Minimum services like the water pipes and garbage collection are received in these bidonvilles. Such bidonvilles have been created and broadened to incorporate hovels that were dissipated all through the city (whose proprietors had to proceed onward because of the requirement of laws against hunching down). The occupants of these settlements are that as it may, are continually undermined by moving to different destinations, should part of or the entirety of the land be sold and the new proprietor wishes to change the utilization of his territory. Since 1956, the legislature has been endeavoring to take out these sorts of residences by buying the land from the examiners and transforming them into government-controlled lodging advancements.

**Assembled bidonvilles** are categorized as the specifically assigned plots for bidonville and dour settlements created out of national-level pressures to eliminate bidonvilles. These state constructed dwellings have access to adequate municipal services consisting of water pipes, postal delivery, garbage collection, and health services access... Frequently, inhabitants get restricted property titles in these conditions. However, it must be noticed that these residences are intensely reliant on and impacted by the requests and unstable plan of the state.

2.3.2 Spatial localization

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Urban, rural and mixed douars in the city of Marrakech

FIG. 18
Ahkaf bidonvilles are properties in Marrakech that are a type of religious-inherited, family-shared land ownership which cannot be sold or transferred out of kinship bonds. While some of the little douars have been raised on certain Ahkaf property, a critical bit of this property was bought by the state in 2001 utilizing famous space laws. In association with neighborhood collectives, obtaining of these properties was made more straightforward. The collective’s position was used to get land from owners that declined to help out the state, eventually turning out to resemble the amassed bidonville plots referenced already. (Ibrahim, W., 2015).

There are several major douars in Marrakech (ndr. the main ones area shown in the second-to-come page) and we can notice that even if they are distributed on all the city surface, the larger ones are located at what used to be the periphery of the city. As we can see in the same image, the douar of Marrakech can be found in six main segments of the city (Menara, Gueliz, Annakhil, Kasbah and the largest one in Sidi Youssef Ben Ali with around 80,000 inhabitants).

Even if we have this summary data, we are not really sure about the amount of people living there, because of the lack of information by the department of statistics (which only considers the registered inhabitants) and on the other hand because of the migration of people, considering relatives, friends, new migrants, etc...
Spatial localization of the Douars in the city of Marrakech

FIG. 22
FIG. 23

CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL OF DOUARS

ADOBE
CEMENT
ADOBE + CEMENT MIX

Number of total dwellings

100 200 300
2.3.3 The case of Sidi Youssef Ben Ali (SYBA)

The district of Sidi Youssef Ben Ali (SYBA) is a spontaneous extension of the Medina towards south and beyond the city walls. It has almost the same urban and architectural characteristics as the Medina. During its emergence, it was a marginal area deprived of any infrastructural facilities required for a typical urban life during its emergence. Today it is the largest district of the city of Marrakech after the Medina.

From 1939 to 1943, this neighborhood has undergone a drastic change, because of the increasing pace of the rural exodus. Despite its large extension, this district has not been able to attract the attention of the local authorities until 1948, when a flood caused widespread devastation (Mandleur, 1972). To avoid future damage by floods, local government officials laid out plans to restructure the district. They aimed to reconstruct much of the dwellings in public housing estates and acquired land for it through expropriation.

The SYBA sector currently consists of two urbanistically and architecturally distinct divisions. Unplanned or spontaneous, the first division is dominated by the so-called traditional habitat. These are the residencies of the impoverished population. The other division, in turn, has an urban plan that follows contemporary urban planning rules. The buildings do not exceed 150 m² in extension, or three floors in height. While this part of the neighborhood has been planned to offer its inhabitants normal living conditions, it is worth mentioning that the unplanned part of the neighborhood records, to date, high levels of inadequate living conditions and of insecurity.

The same applies to other peripheral douars that were later incorporated into the city. There are many reasons that contributed to the overspill of the Medina and to the creation of the small, spontaneous towns (douars), some of which have already been mentioned earlier: the gradual increase in demand for housing, the weakness of the public supply, the high rental payments and the disengagement of the public authorities during the colonial times. Under these circumstances, expelled from the official housing market and from the Medina, people searched for a place to settle down.

The risks notwithstanding, they occupied pieces of neighboring farmlands in the hope of building there their modest homes and, eventually, being able to own the land under their shelters. Subsequently, in order to feel safe and protected, the occupiers paid a few family members to settle nearby and these, in turn, invited others.

According to Mandleur (1972), the appearance of peripheral douars was the second phase of urbanization in the precarious Marrakech, from 1926 onwards. The first period between 1930 and 1950 were characterized by the illegal and provisional installation of the first inhabitants in private and state-owned fields (guiches). Over the years and with the steady influx of newcomers, the precarious constructions grew in size and became more concrete. This is when the first constructions in cob and stone started to appear.

Small towns were created before the public authorities would express their discontent. These towns were soon regarded as unhealthy environments with an almost total absence of necessary socio-economic facilities. The douars were not officially registered or even recognized by the authorities, which explains their lack of intervention.

The marginalization of the douar population and its classification as non-urban is mostly due to the type of habitat that does not fill the standards set up by the urban planning services. The households that originated from the countryside have developed in the peripheral douars a new type of habitat that is classified as semi-urban, or semi-rural. The households originated from the Medina, in turn, constructed these spaces according to the traditional or Arab-Muslim habitat model.

As said before, the douars figured as places where the rates of unsafely, insecurity, underemployment, unemployment and crimes were high. In addition, these neighborhoods highlighted the problems of poverty and of social discrimination. Those inhabitants who managed to enter the job market could increase their fortunes, while those who did not, could hardly afford basic goods for living. This resulted in the hierarchization of the city’s population, with the emergence and dominance of a materialistic, separatist and segregationist ideology.
2.3.4 Materiality and technique

The informal planning of the douars follows a similar pattern, even if the conditions may vary.

"Thousands of square meters of corrugated iron sheets, which constitute the roofs of these barracks are covered by every available heavy object such as stone, rock, wooden boxes, boards, scarp, iron, etc... to protect from incremental weather."

Housing are grouped into vast rectangular blocks separated by unpaved roads and sometimes walls built by the state to shield the city from the "unsightly" view of dense, unregulated housing. Often, these vast areas are used as public spaces or playground.

Both in summer and winter the living conditions are not human: in summer the hot weather of the city in addition to the metal roofing, while in winter the cold with the unpaved roads make them muddy due to limited drainage.

Primary resources may also vary from settlement to settlements, for example for the water which is accessible only from the fountains installed by the municipality, usually very crowded and not adequate in terms of number. Sewer and drainage as we said are not enough and readily available.
“We closed our eyes the day we allowed the first shacks to be set up instead of punishing the authorities who allowed these scandalous constructions. We have been responsible for this situation for 15 years. Our responsibility does not date back to today. From the very beginning we had the legal means to prevent families from coming to build their houses in the cities”.


“We have observed the horrible aspects [of unsanitary housing] over the past two years, investigating first-hand the situation of our loyal subjects, in the North as well as in the South, in the East as well as in the West of the Kingdom.

[...]

Furthermore, and in order that the extension of the powers of local communities and the prospect of electoral deadlines in our country do not constitute a fertile field and a favorable opportunity for the dangerous escalation of this phenomenon, the duty is to ensure strict enforcement of the law, to prevent any slippage or abuse of these powers and so that these deadlines are not exploited for clientelic and electoral purposes, when trying to collect votes”.


These extracts from speeches made twenty years after Hassan II and Mohamed VI clearly reflect the ambiguity of public discourse on the slums in Morocco.

The development of the slum phenomenon, considered an anomaly within the urban structure, is often presented as a manifestation of the dysfunctions of state institutions and as the product of a corrupt administration.

However, the state’s tolerance (weakness) towards slums is expressed in the conditional and is likely to end at any time. The slum dwellers are thus condemned to live a precarious and uncertain existence, in a position of legal marginality that strongly limits the possibilities of mobilization and collective demand.

Royal rhetoric on the shallows, however, has evolved over the last twenty years. If the shantytown is still stigmatized as a territory unworthy of the city, its inhabitants are increasingly considered as victims of this situation, even if the attacks of 16 May 2003 have largely contributed to reinforce the disqualification that affects them by overlapping the various labels already in circulation in the urban imagination - which associate shantytowns and social deviance - that of religious extremism and terrorism.

With the alternation of 1998 and the coming to power of Mohamed VI, the desire for a break in the management of the social question in Morocco was manifested. The establishment of the National Human Development Initiative (INDH) in 2005 marked a particularly significant new stage in this evolution of public action.

From the scale of the resources implemented and the ambitions manifested, from the development of a global policy at national level but intended to be applied flexibly at local level (with in particular the definition of priority sites), the authorities stress the decentralized nature of project management. All ongoing shantytown projects must be implemented “in synergy” with INDH, in a spirit of “good governance” in accordance with the injunctions of
international organizations and donors.

In the context of Marrakech, the managerial vision of the city leads to public actions differentiated according to urban margins. Therefore, depending on the geographical location of a shantytown, its absorption leads to more or less crucial problems for the aggregation.

First of all, the approach of spontaneous urbanization in Morocco and that of the evolutionary responses of the State lead to presenting the slums of Marrakech as a residual form of unhealthy housing.

Then, the zoom carried out on these shantytowns tries to interpret the purpose of the actions to absorb the urban margins from the inhabitants’ point of view.

Finally, the presentation of the problems of public interventions in the slums leads to a national synthesis to identify the constraints generated by the new procedures experimented with the "Ville Sans Bidonville" program.

The strategy used by the Moroccan state to manage the "Kararies" (bidonvilles) and maintain social peace at the lowest cost is ambiguous and fluctuating. It unfolds between prohibition and laissez-faire, even if since the end of the eighties and especially since the nineties the inhabitants have successfully multiplied the initiatives of "nibbling" and tapping, gradually obtaining, fragmentary, improvements in their living conditions.

The authorities, for their part, have always played from the beginning on the illegal nature of the settlements in order to keep the inhabitants of the slums in a position of "pseudo-clandestinity", of latent insecurity that feeds their fragility in relation to power and constitutes a particularly effective means of control and subordination since it limits the crystallization of frustrations and the affirmation of claims. The shantytown is at best tolerated by public authorities, but it cannot claim formal status or official recognition.

The purpose of this report is to analyze if the introduction of new slogans in the unsanitary housing absorption policies (and in particular the declared willingness to take into account the social dimension in the slum actions), really leads to a change in the practices and strategies of the actors.
At the beginning of the 20th century, one in ten Moroccans lived in the city. This ratio rose to one in three in 1971, one in two in 1994 and the rate of urbanization exceeded 55% in 2004. The urban population has increased from 3.4 to 16.5 million inhabitants in four decades (1960-2004), yet housing supply remains below requirements. In this context, slums (270,000 huts) and unregulated neighborhoods (520,000 families) account for one fifth of the urban population.

Unregulated housing districts - so-called clandestine, built without authorization on illegally divided private land - appeared in the 1970s and today group more people than shantytowns. While the census of barracks carried out in 1992 facilitates the containment of urban shantytowns within their then circumscribed geographical limits, informal access to land opens up the possibility for immigrant families in the cities to buy land and build a house (1 to 4 levels). In response to the gap between supply and demand for housing, irregular housing - in terms of spatial and urban planning - remains tolerated; the authorities have (had) a tendency to let things happen: a laissez-faire approach that preludes to recognition.

Therefore, slums are intended for evacuation, while illegal neighborhoods are involved in the process of urban standardization and security of land ownership after equipment and renovation in situ:

- Living in a slum opens up the prospect of new housing resettlement is a form of compensation for removal that represents a cost for public authorities (subsidies) and almost a right for the beneficiaries;
- Living in an unregulated area allows you to be safe from eviction measures, even if the inhabitants do not have a land title.

Sources.

3.1 BETWEEN “MANAGEMENT BY LACK” AND THE ELIMINATION OF SHALLOWS

3.1.1 Dynamics of spontaneous urbanisation: the slums, then the unregulated residential districts

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Sources.
No construction permit can be legally issued to the slum; only precarious materials (corresponding to precarious legal status) are generally tolerated in the construction of housing. Spatial planning initiatives by the inhabitants (“heavy” construction of barracks, introduction of a waste water supply network, paving of a lane, etc.) are both widely prohibited and strictly controlled, as they are likely to be interpreted as a form of recognition by the public authorities of the settlement of the inhabitants.

The topography of the place thus configures power relations and constitutes a political stake. Everything is done to show (with material but also symbolic signs) that the Karians do not belong to the real city, while guaranteeing the inhabitants of the slums a minimum margin of action to improve their living conditions, but not to take full possession of the space.

The state is both absent from Karians, as it refuses to introduce the most basic forms of equipment generally available to regular segments of the city (running water, electricity, sewerage, waste collection, public transport, maintenance of order, etc.).

It is also present, as it strives to maintain the precariousness of the place on a daily basis. The authorities therefore implement in the slum the “management by lack”, a “presence by absence”: lack of infrastructures, absence of collective services, which paradoxically can be interpreted as the sign of a public taking of the place and its inhabitants, of a power in vacuum, in negative.

However, public authorities cannot completely prevent the inhabitants’ attempts to take over the place: they multiply daily a “silent invasion of the ordinary”, a tiny invasion, invisible but not without consequences on the socio-demographic structure of the country, since more than 8% of the inhabitants of urban areas now live in the shantytown (a fact that also qualifies the nature of their “marginal” and “normal” character in the city.).

Impossible to prevent any form of spatial planning, the authorities mainly try to mortgage the result. Adjustments are constant, but they are constantly random. Even if an attempt to move is successful (building a new room, a floor) in the sense that it is not directly repressed, the improvement obtained is never achieved.

The process of decentralization (started in 1976), combined with political liberalization orchestrated “from above” in the early 1990s, helped to shift and transform the status quo established between the various local slum actors.

The configurations and balances of power change from one slum to another, but we can say that as a general rule, the limits of the conceivable and the feasible have expanded considerably and the rules of the game have evolved, opening more room for manoeuvre to the Karians in spatial planning.

The latter have greater possibilities of direct pressure on their elected representatives (who are responsible for the management of the territory that previously belonged to the public authorities), and the elected representatives are more inclined than the State to satisfy the requests of the population. They can act as mediators between the inhabitants and the authorities, proposing and orchestrating illegal (but considered legitimate) responses and solutions to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers.

In addition to the administration of the shantytown by absence, the authoritarian State also takes the second type of action to stem the protest against the Karians, through the implementation of “absorption” programs aimed at bringing this territory away from urban grammar.

Classically, the submission of the governed to the coercion of power “finds its counterpart in the allocation of resources that can contribute to a better life: the State attempts with this form of redistribution to orbit “the inhabitants of the slums: to” the statization of the society of the slums “, which” hinders the emancipation of individuals and the empowerment of social institutions, channels of citizenship “responds to” the patronage “of this same company by the State.

This is to avoid that precarious living conditions lead to desperate attempts and lead to a transition towards open and violent sedition.

Public policies fuel residents’ hopes and thus promote a wait-and-see attitude towards power. The voice and the “myth” of rehousing, always present in people’s minds even if no public action is foreseen for this or that Karien, therefore also contributes to throw the inhabitants of the slums into a random horizon, into a universe of contingency.
In this sense, the Moroccan State remains neo-patrimonial in the way it operates and in the expectations it arouses, even in a context of strong contraction of public spending and financial crisis of the State.

At the same time, public action reinforces the stigmatization of the slum by actively working for its disappearance. On the one hand, the state refuses to develop the Karians and refuses the inhabitants themselves to develop their residential space; on the other hand, it underlines the material and symbolic exteriority of the territory by supporting and organizing its destruction and relocating the populations to the outskirts of the city.

Committed to the daily negotiation of improvements (which can be considered derisory, but which have a considerable material and symbolic significance), committed also to fantasize about a future fact of standardized integration in the city, the inhabitants of the slums do not adopt practices of revolt. However, state policy creates strong expectations that encourage the development of common registers of legitimacy, essentially based on the notion of social rights (right to housing, right to health, etc.).

The ambivalence of public policies responds to the ambivalence of the political representations of slum dwellers, which are organized between criticism and demand for authority.

The Karians develop the paradoxical image of a public authority sometimes discredited for its incompetence, sometimes for its power of annoyance, but which arouses considerable hope.

3.1.3 Displacement and re-grouping of populations

The development of the slums dates back to the protectorate. The creation of a “police system” in the 1920s, characterized by lines of control around the cities, the refusal of the right to free movement and operations to repel peasants to their douars of origin, followed more flexible policies for the grouping of shantytowns outside the urban perimeter.

It is therefore above all a question of “cleaning up” certain parts of the city and maintaining a sense of existential uncertainty among the slum populations. The aim is not to eradicate the slums completely: the public authorities are not materially capable of doing so; the slum dwellers also constitute a large reserve of workers. It is in this tension between the rejection of a form of housing considered unworthy of the city, and the attraction exerted by the concentration of cheap labour (all the more docile as one always feels threatened with eviction) that is orchestrated by urban policy towards the slums.

The prohibition of the shantytown is thus explained by the security strategy of the Protectorate, worried about the “birth” of a proletariat which risks becoming a dangerous class. It is also explained by hygienic considerations. After a typhus epidemic, a law of July 1938 decreed that:

“[...] Slums no longer have the right to exist [...] Any dwelling that does not correspond, since its creation, to official standards of a technical nature is now liable to be immediately destroyed - without any compensation - by agents of the State.”

Slum dwellers, unhealthy city dwellers, are thus excluded from the city but also (and perhaps above all) from the scope of the law: they are therefore subject to the good will of the public authorities.
3.1.4 Housing policy for the largest number of people

With the establishment of a social policy since 1946, initiated to stem the national movement, the grouping of slums was previously carried out on equipped land (sanitary fixtures). The grouping should allow rationalized control of these populations by removing them from normal habitat areas.

Housing policy for the largest number of people began in Casablanca in 1944, with the construction of Ain Chock City, which was the first major real estate operation sponsored by the Protectorate and planned with the aim of reducing slums.

After the country’s accession to independence in 1956, the Moroccan government was in a sense obliged, in order to preserve its legitimacy, to carry out - particularly in the social housing sector - an action at least as important as that carried out by the colonial regime.

Until the beginning of the 1960s, Morocco was one of the underdeveloped countries in this area where, in proportion to national resources, the greatest budgetary and technical effort was made to develop subsidized housing programs. Housing complexes are developing on the outskirts of Moroccan cities, sets of standardized units that record monotony and repetition in the urban landscape.

Housing programs, however, have not achieved the desired effects: in 1950 there were 300,000 slum dwellers, while in 1968 their number had tripled. In reality, the vast majority of the housing units built went to the middle classes or to more affluent urban categories than the slum dwellers.

It should also be said that in the 1960s priority was given to the rural world: the action of public authorities at housing level was integrated into the framework of the hydro-agricultural development policy of large irrigation schemes, protecting rural populations at the level of small towns and curbing the rural exodus.


“Unsanitary habitat. The city will raze 40 douars” - 2011  

Article from “The Economist”

"The programme is going well […] In total, 29 douars are interested. They host 3,700 families. By the end of 2011, all the slums registered under this programme are expected to be renovated and in 2012 about 40 slums comprising 4,268 families will have to be razed to the ground".

"To definitively stop the haemorrhage of the proliferation of douars and the fragmentation of existing houses, it was necessary to cast a wide net, adopting a participatory approach of the inhabitants themselves”.

3.2 FUNCTIONING OF URBAN MARGINS AND ABSORPTION OPERATIONS: MARRAKECH, A “VILLE SANS BIDONVILLES”

3.2.1 Changes in policies to combat antigenic housing: integration against the elimination of slums

The 1980s marked a resumption of shantytown redevelopment operations, after the state’s disengagement in favour of the prevention of unsanitary housing (development of residential complexes, 1970s). This strengthening of the corrective component of social housing policy responds to the growth of unregulated neighborhoods and is reflected in the creation of the National Agency for the fight against unhygienic housing (1984): ANHI is taking action to restructure illegal neighborhoods and relaunch the resettlement of slums.

Between 1982 and 1992 there are more resettlement lots allocated to slum dwellers than restructuring units (61 and 39% of the total respectively), so this distribution is reversed in favour of irregular neighborhoods. This development is in line with urban dynamics as the so-called illegal becomes the majority compared to the barracks1. The State therefore favours integration in situ (by equipping and restructuring the existing one) rather than the evacuation of the slums. This is an orientation confirmed by the National Action Programme for the absorption of unsanitary housing (PARHI, 2001), whose genesis is examined here:

As the fight against poverty became the priority of the alternating government formed in 1998, a series of evaluations of strategies were established to reduce unsanitary housing. The aim was to identify ways to design and implement projects, distinguishing between methods that lead to success and those that lead to failure.

In addition to this critical approach, there is an empirical evaluation carried out in seven major cities through workshops bringing together the main actors.

Thematic and regional workshops lead to a “national consensus” included in a framework agreement: the PARHI, established at the end of 2001 for 10 years and allocated through

joint State-local government funding.

This "PARHI of the century" initially underlines the absorption, in particular the restructuring (60% of the amounts). A prevention component (social housing) was then added in order to move towards a twofold objective: on the one hand, to absorb antigenic housing (200,000 families in slums and 430,000 in squatters' neighbourhoods, plus 90,000 houses threatening ruin) and, on the other, to conduct a preventive policy (annual public construction of 23,000 plots and 10,000 houses for low-income families).

Following the appointment of Driss Jettou as Prime Minister (2002-2007), the founder of the Secretary of State of PARHI, Mohamed M'Barki, is replaced by Ahmed Taoufiq Hejira. These ministerial reshuffles announce the replacement of the "Villes Sans Bidonvilles" (VSB) programme for PARHI: according to officials at the Ministry of Construction, the political turnaround will definitively end the 2001 programme in 2002 and for other specialists PARHI now includes VSB.

PARHI has favored the restructuring in situ, while the VSB is giving priority to the eradication of barracks. VSB is a national replication of the UN strategy for Cities Without Slums 2020, even though PARHI was already part of this strategy. However, more than an echo of international injunctions, the Cities Without Slums must be placed in the national context after the deadly attacks on 16 May 2003 in Casablanca where young suicide bombers left the slums to "blow themselves up" in the city centre.

Finally, the PARHI has provided for State-Region agreements, while the PVSBB is theoretically part of a decentralization process at municipal level. The "City Contracts" signed between the State and local authorities constitute the conventional framework of the PVSBB: after a municipal diagnosis, they define the coherence of the programme, the operational modalities and the sources of financing. Beyond the objective of "stopping proliferation", each contract sets a deadline for the total elimination of unsanitary housing; around 70 municipalities should therefore be declared shantyless by 2010.
**Legend:**
1. United Nations
2. Reign of Morocco
3. Government of Morocco
4. City Alliance
5. Partnerships at International Level (European Union, EIB, AFD, European Commission)
6. Institutional and Technical Support (World Bank, USAID, French Cooperation)
7. Partnerships at National Level (Public Housing Organisations)
8. Regional Coordinating Comitéé
9. Provincial Comitéé for Identification and Implementation of Work
10. Municipality of Marrakech
11. “VSB” Program
12. Local Authorities
13. Public Operators
14. Local Associations
15. Local Communities

**GOALS**
- Eradicate accommodation that does not comply with existing standards, creating new ones
- Promotion of strict and rigorous forms of control in the management of public affairs
- Preserving the dignity of the citizen, guaranteeing him or her a dignified home

**MAIN ACTORS**
- Local policies and associations
- The United Nations Millennium Declaration
- The “Ville Sans Bidonvilles” Plan, developed by the Cities Alliance and launched by the United Nations in 1999

**STRATEGIES**
- Stopping their proliferation; Simplification of procedures; Coverage of cities with urban planning documents
- Prevention and promotion of social habitat; Mobilisation of public land; Partnership with the private sector; Creation of guarantee funds; Extension of microcredit to social housing
- The priority is to reduce shantytowns in urban areas

**Deficits**
- Housing; Infrastructures; Lack in the production of absorption units

**Inadequacies**
- Lack of social housing and land for them; Free transformation; Limited economic resources

**SLUMS**
- Poor hygiene conditions; Conflicts with Medina residents and local officials and polices

**2000 - Turning Point: “Ville Sans Bidonville” Program**
3.2.2 VSB: the purpose and the housing strategy

The Cities Without Slums Programme (VSB), launched in 2004 by the Moroccan Government, has made it possible to significantly reduce the slums initially targeted and improve the quality of life in the slums housing conditions of low-income households.

The context in which the implementation of the VSB Programme has evolved has been particularly decisive. Its imbalances between supply and demand have generated a significant housing deficit estimated at nearly 700,000 units and an equipment infrastructure deficit of almost 540,000 units. The phenomenon of the slums of Marrakech is recent. Some are rather non-regulatory neighborhoods, consisting of housing built without authorization on land without basic infrastructure. They were created clandestinely by speculators. But for others, more rural, it is the city that has come to them.

The aim was to identify the areas for reform and define innovative and proactive programmes capable of responding to them in a more appropriate way to the needs of social housing promotion, resorption, and prevention of substandard housing and urban development anticipation.

The upgrading of the housing supply was carried out in particular thanks to:
- The mobilization of public land (more than 8,000 ha to date) which, despite its unequal geographical distribution, contributed to increasing the social offer through housing estates and major development operations (ZUN, urban centers and new towns) and also supports numerous operations of the VSB programme;
- The reform of real estate taxation to encourage private property developers to increase the supply of social housing

The programme is subsidized by the State and the operations undertaken are subject to agreements between the MHU and its supervisory organizations.

In its analysis (reported below), the program analyzed the weakness (deficit and inadequacies) in strategies adopted by the city. Working on these themes, it defined the main goals and actors involved in the program, placing the formation of new strategies to adopt in the city.

The renovation is one of the two roads identified to put an end to the scourge once and for all. For this phase, the actors in the program mean the connection to water, electricity, telephone networks and road development. Subsequently, families will have to access the land titles, not before they have complied with the urban planning regulations in force and undertake work on their homes’ facades and interiors.

The second avenue of the programme to combat unsanitary housing is resettlement. About 40 shantytowns had to be razed to the ground and their inhabitants resettled in reception sites identified in the pockets still free from the urban perimeter.

These are the two main roads identified by the “city without shantytowns” program that was reactivated in 2010.

The city of Marrakech has about 8,000 unsanitary settlements, habitats that have grown in recent years. In fact, one of the problems of Marrakech’s slums is their proliferation. Proliferation occurred, it must be said, under the “benevolent” eyes of the authorities and elected officials.

Hence the difficulties of this rather complicated census which caused some delays in the programme. “In order to stop the haemorrhage of the proliferation of douars and the fragmentation of existing houses for good, it was necessary to lay down a wide network”, said Abdelghani Ouchen, responsible for the anti-sanitary housing division at the City Hall of Marrakech. “Adopting a participatory approach by the inhabitants themselves”.

It was necessary to convince the families of some douars of the need to be evicted in the field. Many shanty-towns were built on private land with 4m2 housing. Although aware of their illegal situation, the families refused, for example, to be resettled far from Marrakech, in Tamansourt. In previous programmes, the satellite city had been identified as the only host site.

The new VSB programme provides alternative solutions through other host sites. Five ground bases have been identified

(250,000 DH) and low VIT (140,000 DH);
- The development of public-private partnerships to support the public sector in the development of the housing sector.
and acquisition procedures are underway: at these bases, the families of each douar will travel to the nearest host site in 2012. But first, it is necessary to clean up the land bases (downgrading of irrigation sites, etc.) and develop the spaces in terms of roads and connection to electricity, water and sanitation networks.

In addition, the programme states that each family received a landscaping plot and financial assistance of 20,000 DH (bear in mind that Marrakech is the only city where slum dwellers continue to receive financial assistance for each relocation, in addition to a developed and named plot).

This programme is part of a larger one, at regional level, which is carried out by the Ministry of Housing and the management of the local authorities and to which the King, the urban municipality, and the beneficiaries contribute.

Since the attacks of 16 May 2003, the executive formally reaffirmed its ambition to ‘eradicate’ the slums: in application of the guidelines of the royal speech to Parliament in 2003, making social housing one of the four national priorities (with ‘productive employment, economic development and useful education’), a government action programme entitled ‘cities without slums’ (VSB), whose objective is to eliminate within 15 years ‘all slums in all Moroccan cities, or at least to make it a residual phenomenon’.

This involves tripling the production capacity of housing for slum families and increasing it from 9,000 to 30,000 units per year, mobilizing an investment of about 17,118 million dirhams.

The “VSB” programme is implemented through the definition of “city contracts” linking the state and urban municipalities at agglomeration level.

The State is supporting the funding of these programmes, which are carried out in the form of on-site renovation, residential complexes or relocation of housing.

The urban municipality, for its part, undertakes, in collaboration with the territorial administration, to ensure the non-proliferation of existing shantytowns and the prohibition of all new developments, just as the urban municipality may, depending on these priorities and, if its means permit, contribute to reducing the participation of the beneficiaries.

The approach was new and all in all unique, because it involved bringing together ministerial departments, public enterprises, but also the private sector and associations around a framework agreement aimed at the total elimination of slums in a given location.
“VSB: We need to rethink the modus operandi” - 2018

“We were born in this part of Marrakech. We don’t want to be expelled to a suburban centre far from any commercial activity and our customers”, says a young street vendor who lives in a douar outside the walls of the Medina. This shanty town, together with Sidi Abdellah Belhaj, has been hospitalised […] This creates a certain tension among the inhabitants”.

“VSB: The Court of Auditors’ no-appeal verdict” - 2020

“The “Cities Without Slums” programme was launched in 2004 as part of the state’s housing policy, in accordance with actual guidelines and various government subsidies. The goal set at the outset is to eliminate all slums by 2010. At the end of 2018 the programme was still running with disappointing results”. The authors of the report recommend the adoption of an integrated approach to human development, which goes beyond the habitat objective to include economic and social aspects in new host sites”.

3.3 FROM THE ENUNCIATION OF SLOGANS TO THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATIONAL TRANSLATION

3.3.1 Recognition of the need to take the social dimensions into account in slum policies

With the establishment of the VSB program and the INDH, previously inaudible concepts (such as that of social support, that of the participation of populations in urban “production” and management, or as the need to integrate the sustainable dimension of urban development) are claimed by decision-makers to illustrate the process of modernization and opening up of public action in Morocco.

We must underline the significant evolution of the discourse of politicians (but also of public action technicians), who now recognize that producing housing to solve an urban problem does not lead to the expected results: we agree today that the population must be taken into account to enable them to accept projects and take ownership of their new residential environment.

Beyond the social need, it appears that social support also stems from an institutional request from operators waiting for mediators to deal with the populations. These have in fact integrated the new room for maneuver available to them in a context of “authoritarian decompression”, and are more demanding, requiring listening and know-how that decentralized structures are not able to put into practice.

The new (and late) integration of the glossary of good governance advocated by international organizations (World Bank, UNDP, UN-Habitat, etc.) thus reflects an undeniable transformation (even if it remains relative) in mentalities.

The use of the key words (the “right words”) of development is in itself a performative character, in the sense that it constitutes a mark of recognition of the merits of international injunctions, and where it in turn leads to recognition.

However, in practice, this programme reproduces the old models of public intervention. The principles of action seem unchanged: operations are still planned, slum by slum and we remain in a very quantitative approach where projects are evaluated on the basis of the number of huts destroyed and families “treated”. A bit as if in the end it is a matter of filling in boxes to meet the requirements of municipal contracts, and each
box is associated with a neighborhood or slum, with no possibility of a more global response. Although the VSB programme may seem a particularly “flexible” tool in practice, the principles of action have changed little.

As for the multiplication of the actors involved in the VSB programme, this does not prevent a lack of communication and cooperation between actors, nor does it guarantee cross-sectionalism. Therefore, it is perhaps due to its exclusively political composition that the national VSB Steering Committee develops solutions that often remain inapplicable in practice due to the absence of technical relay teams able to ensure follow-up or translation concrete decisions. Regarding the regularization of land, the committee, on the Ministry of Housing initiative, wishes to avoid blocking renovation projects even if the land has not been reclaimed. The urban agencies and land conservation, however, categorically refuse to regularize the land a posteriori. Without legislative changes.

Another example that illustrates the limits of the participation of new actors in public policy is the local authority charter phenomenon, i.e. the programme assigns responsibility for social development to local authorities (city council and regional council). Yet, in fact, they do not have the financial means to impose the new directives.

On the other hand, the Ministry of Housing cannot sanction communities that do not fulfill the missions defined in the municipal contracts; at most, it can terminate some deals that have never been done). The absence of overall planning and budgets (in terms of equipment in particular) established between the various ministries is also a sign that governance implementation remains limited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems before PVSB</th>
<th>Adopted procedures in the PVSB</th>
<th>New constraints</th>
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<td>Development deficit land and equipment plots of land</td>
<td>Subdivisions, systematically serviced and equipped</td>
<td>Cost for insolvent persons (despite subsidies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial recovery from of beneficiary households of the amounts due to housing operators</td>
<td>Conditionality of the payment of the amounts due to obtain the certificate of attribution of the lot</td>
<td>Cost for insolvent persons (despite subsidies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The barracks were not systematically destroyed after the transfer. Other families settled there and it was difficult afterwards to dislodge them without compensate with a lot.</td>
<td>(a) The census file (from 1992) is the basic document for determining the list of beneficiary households; (b) Obligation to destroy the hut before obtaining the certificate of allocation</td>
<td>a) The census file may be contested (family problems, disputes between neighbours); (b) Temporary housing after the demolition of the hut (cost of rent)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barracks were built on the lots of resettlement.</td>
<td>Obligation to value one’s lot (build a house) before occupying it</td>
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<td>“Slippage”: sale of the lot by the beneficiary</td>
<td>Prohibition to resell the lot before 5 to 10 years</td>
<td>Circumvented rule (with legal means)</td>
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Tab. 3 - Table produced by us, 2020.
**Douars.** Characterized by an Informal life

2 different visions of it

- Poverty, environmental toxicity, sickness
- People stripped of their rights
- Limited access to the culture of work culture and class struggle
- "Alchemical capacity" to live and prosper
- Symbol of popular revolt vs. state bureaucracy

**VILLE SANS BIDONVILLE**

The inhabitants of these places are forced to live a **precarious and uncertain existence**, characterised by political and legal marginality that limits collective demand

**Final Considerations**

- VSB is based on the old models of public intervention, with the same principles of action: it has a more quantitative than qualitative approach

**Limits**

- This intervention is organised by a complex political composition, in which the responsibilities are entrusted to local authorities which do not have the financial means to impose themselves

**Geographical**

- The re-organization of these Douars not only creates urban and social tensions but also within them, related to their own organization
- Lack of management and land polices (increase in shallows, proliferation of anti-hygienic housing, lack of building land) + Douars not marked in urban statistics + Population increase

**Political**

- Shortage in the housing products market for low-income families + Taxes increase on cls that plague construction companies + Gap of communication between the different institutions and groups involved

**Social**

- People are forced to move from their homes to more peripheral areas, moving away from the main services, infrastructures, workplaces and families + Temporary accommodation are available for a certain period of time + Disadvantages and clashes with inhabitants located near these new settlement areas

**People stripped of their rights**

- Limited access to the culture of work culture and class struggle
- "Alchemical capacity" to live and prosper
- Symbol of popular revolt vs. state bureaucracy

**Shortage in the housing products market for low-income families**

- Taxes increase on cls that plague construction companies + Gap of communication between the different institutions and groups involved

**People are forced to move** from their homes to more peripheral areas, moving away from the main services, infrastructures, workplaces and families + Temporary accommodation are available for a certain period of time + Disadvantages and clashes with inhabitants located near these new settlement areas
3.3.2 The social as an Alibi

The social can sometimes serve as a means of justification used by operators to make it easier to pass on unchanged solutions and practices, falling under the authoritarian and classic voluntarism of the public actor. Public bodies, NGOs, but also the few consulting firms engaged in “social project management” or social support to projects, do not hide their reluctance to address the practices of public authorities, and denounce the “lubricant” role they try to play to move slum populations quickly and smoothly and criticize the distance between public discourse and its operational translation.

Thus, for example, these social workers express great reservations about “constrained” relocation projects, which offer no room for manoeuvre and, moreover, are intended to relocate the inhabitants of suburban slums. They denounce the instrumentalisation of their action, which acts as a “cover” to pass the central decision (social action replacing the old manifestations of strength), and to “drag” the slum dwellers from their place of residence without difficulty (often located within the city walls), in a place of resettlement or resettlement, sometimes peripheral and without equipment.

As for the slums present in Marrakech (but also in other Moroccan cities, such as Casablanca), although they are now much more open to restructuring operations in situ, they refuse any form of maintaining and supporting the disappearance of the place and name. Residents will be relocated several kilometers away from urban infrastructure and services.

It also seems that the public authorities have tried to involve social workers in the project, but initially refused to invest in land where only the urban planning component had been maintained at the expense of socio-economic variables.

In addition to the issues mentioned above, there are other issues arising from situations relating to the polices and management of the PVSFB in the slums:

01. A monitoring committee got lost in the street.
   A national monitoring committee, chaired by the head of government, was responsible for supervising the implementation and evaluation of the programme. This body got lost along the way.

02. Deterioration of equalization indicators.
   The Court made observations, one of which states the failure of the initial funding plan for the programme, which was essentially based on contributions from beneficiaries.

   The shortcomings are numerous: random financial arrangement of operations, differences between the cost of equipping the plots of land reserved for relocation and the selling price. In addition, there is the deterioration of equalization indicators as a basis for financing and difficulties in collecting contributions from beneficiaries.

   The situation worsened with the decrease in FSHIU’s main resources and the decrease in the share dedicated to the VSB programme. A considerable difference between the structure of the programmed funding and the reality of the facts does not help things. On the contrary, in reality, the financing of some operations was mainly based on equalization income up to 90% in the Eastern region and 89% in Marrakech. Elsewhere, family contributions were marginal in the financial arrangements of the programmes, i.e. 17% in the Tangier-Tétouan-Al Hoceima region and 1% in some local VSB programmes such as the Marrakech region.

03. Random financial arrangement
   The report also highlighted the ineffectiveness of the financing plan. The investment was expected to reach 17.714 billion DH at the end of 2010, with the State providing aid in the order of 5.560 billion DH to 270,000 families. However, in 2018, the investment was 28.2 billion DH, with State aid of 7.03 billion DH for 294,134 families. Moreover, FSHIU aid was not controlled either, with disparities between regions in the granting of this support.

   The Court of Auditors’ magistrates noted that some operations were largely financed by this Fund, with a lack of rigour in the mobilisation of State aid.

   In addition, the absence of clear rules gives the parties involved in the mobilisation of State aid a greater margin of appreciation.

   The VSB programme was based on 37% of the Fund’s funding. Finally, this share did not exceed 21% between 2008 and 2018. However, expenditure increased to finance other programmes such as the renovation of unsanitary housing and participation in city policy operations. The decrease in fiscal
resources on concrete and reinforcing bars to feed the Fund has not helped things.

The Court of Auditors’ report made a number of recommendations, including the correction of certain weaknesses related to the fight against unhygienic housing as for the City Without Slums programme. Therefore, it will be a question of ensuring control of the number of beneficiaries, with a precise definition of criteria, the adoption of a realistic financing plan and compliance with it. It will also be necessary to clean up and rationalize the base on the ground, in strict compliance with the deadlines for carrying out the operations. Similarly, coordination between the various operations and programmes must be improved.

Furthermore, the authors of the report recommend the adoption of an integrated approach to human development, which goes beyond the habitat objective to include economic and social aspects in the new reception sites. It will be necessary to provide income generating activities and basic public services such as education, health, transport and security. The document also recommends greater rigour in the fight against the expansion of shantytowns, in particular by strengthening control and deterrence mechanisms at legal and technological level.

3.3.3 The social: a political objective like any other?

According to the testimonies of some housing professionals, policymakers have not taken sufficient account of the specificity of the social sector and the need to treat it differently from the more material and technical objectives.

Therefore, urban operators would have liked to evaluate the management of the social project (MOS) by establishing an indicator that essentially took into account the rate of displacement of families. This indicator should have served as a benchmark for calculating the financing of the ADS action.

Besides remaining in a very quantitative approach to the evaluation of public action in the slum areas (the elimination of slums is set as an ideology), such an imperative of results seems particularly unsuited to the social variable and the spirit of the MOS.

Such an approach consists of a way of carrying out a “risk transfer” and responsibility from the urban promoter to the social worker. It tends to make the latter’s mission insignificant, the main objective of which would no longer be to improve the living conditions of populations in a lasting way, but in a more pragmatic way to allow the displacement of several households.

The definition of social support is therefore not simple and is the subject of attempts to impose meaning on the various actors involved, to influence the concrete translation and objectives assigned to the MOS and the social worker. Therefore, an urban worker has tried to persuade a social worker to sign contracts for a predefined period of “actual” work.

Also in this case it is up to the public authorities to transfer a risk, that of duration. In case of interruption of a project’s technical component (land problem, delay in construction or delivery of transfer units, etc.), the operation’s social element must also be suspended.

To postulate such flexibility and adaptability of the MOS demonstrates either a total misunderstanding of the social

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Socio-spatial conflicts and patterns in Marrakech

purpose, or the temptation to strumentalize an underestimated field of action where it is difficult to recognize its full place despite the pleading demands of policies. Its ambivalence, therefore, characterizes public action in shantytowns: to maintain social peace, the authorities maintain their presence through their absence, they oscillate between prohibition and laissez-faire, between promise of relocation and threat of destruction. However, the informal status quo between the public authorities and the Carians has evolved considerably in a direction favourable to the latter, and the authorities now recognise the importance of taking social considerations into account in the implementation of public action.

While fewer than ten slum projects are currently the subject of “social support”, there is a real desire to extend, or even generalize, the process. This makes it possible to bring people’s resistance to exclusion on the periphery to the levels of conception and decision making. On the other hand, the need to provide diversified solutions in terms of unsanitary housing seems to have been more or less explicitly recognized. The assessments of the 1990s, the 2003 attacks, but also the pressure of numbers, pushed public authorities to accept the idea that one-off and immediate improvements could be offered to slum dwellers. Therefore, trivial and informal solutions seem to be developing, mainly due to less pressure from the authorities.

However, it should be noted that the public policies developed towards the shantytowns consist essentially in dramatizing the urban deficiencies of these spaces, and in seeing in their resolution (essentially quantitative) the solution to the social problems of which these territories are revealing as much as they are illustrations, while most of them actually participate in the spatial crystallization of social relations. The policies adopted contribute above all to depoliticize the problem of the Karians, reducing it to a problem of the living environment and obscuring (or even strengthening) the unequal distribution of socio-economic resources.

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**VILLE SANS BIDONVILLE**

- **The various local functional programmes of “re-absorption” of the Douars aim to delete them from the urban grammar of the city**
- **“Statalization” of the slum society, which hinders the emancipation of individuals**
- **The vision of “Re-Housing” creates a random horizon of contingency: it represents a symbolic violence, exerted on the inhabitants**

**TENSION**

Rejection of a form of housing considered inadequate for the city VS presence of an important workforce at a good price; Planned segregation

This initiative (VSB) is considered socially unsuitable and obsolete, as it creates a series of dynamics and situations that preclude social integration and the integration of the douars’ inhabitants within the city

**FROM 1980 TO 2000: EMERGING OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

Instead of eradicating shantytowns, processes can be implemented to bring them up to standard and integrate them into the urban fabric

**CHALLENGES**

- These programmes and initiatives are not subsidised by the State;
- Lack of support from local officials

**STRENGTHS**

- Promotion of a participatory community development

**HOUSING PRODUCTION** as a response to the urban problem does not lead to the expected results;

- The population must be taken into consideration, to enable them to accept projects and take ownership of their new residential environment;
- These new initiatives are the result of an institutional request from the actors and the expectations of mediators who deal with the population;
- Public action in slums must be ambivalent
FIG. 29 - Overview of life and environment at the level of a block of rented social housing, the “new city” in the periphery of Marrakech (2009).

FIG. 30 - An aerial photograph shows “bidonvilles” side by side with new homes in the peripheral area of Marrakech (2005).
FIG. 31 - Overview of slums conditions - a

FIG. 32 - Overview of slums conditions - b
FIG. 33 - Overview of slums conditions - c

FIG. 34 - Overview of slums conditions - d
FIG. 35 - Overview of slums conditions - e

FIG. 36 - Overview of slums conditions - “The slums in Marrakech”
Through this report we went to analyse first of all the current conditions of the city of Marrakech and its shanty towns, through a multidisciplinary approach, based on the reading and reworking of data and graphs, but also reports, articles and newspaper news of the last 20 years.

Although the “Villes Sans Bidonvilles” redevelopment programme started with good intentions and was accepted at the beginning both by the inhabitants of the city and the shantytowns themselves, in reality it has become obsolete, based on an old model of intervention that does not follow the current urban policies and the new needs of the population.

Instead of going to implement a re-qualification of the shantytown area, trying to integrate them into the city and bring them up to standard, it seems almost more like a reclamation intervention in the area, through the demolition of houses and moving the population to temporary and peripheral areas, kilometers away from the city.

This is to be considered unacceptable, since in the approach of this programme there are a series of limitations, geographical and polices management but, first of all, social ones. the report aims to highlight the various shortcomings, disconnections and inadequacies of certain management choices of the areas adopted by the programme, which create a situation of fragmentation and lack of communication between the various actors and institutions. this goes, therefore, to characterize the vision and image of today’s shantytowns.

The participation of the inhabitants is now the cornerstone of slum upgrading projects, without the content or even the objectives of this participation being clearly defined. Experience shows that, depending on how it is implemented, participation can take various forms, from manipulated and strumentalized participation to real instances of co-decision and shared power, through passive and consultative participation1.

The participation of resettled families tends towards a material and economic dimension, but the difficulties of this participation in the market slow down the process, due to the lack of solvency and financial mechanisms adapted to the needs.

The “social project management”, which theoretically aims to involve slum dwellers in the development of transfer methods upstream of the start of the projects, is limited in practice to information and administrative support (passive participation), assistance in the management of projects to recover part of the costs from families (participation in the market) and sometimes persuasion (manipulated participation).

Is the slum a sustainable or transitory space? Studies on this subject do not reach a consensus and, so far, cannot lead to the observation that the slum would be “an airlock rather than a trap”.

The public problem of the slums of Marrakech addresses many arguments calling for stabilization, including the recognition of the inhabitants as full citizens, or the logic of dismantling through strict enforcement of property rights. We have tried to underline the limits of this binarity, as well as the fact that the issue of slums cannot be addressed on a global scale due to the heterogeneity of situations.

Indeed, it is difficult to compare the various slums (those in Marrakech with those in Morocco, but also on a global scale), because of the diversity of the types of installations, their temporality, the heterogeneity of the populations or that of the political responses provided make the exercise particularly delicate.

Let us therefore try to show a wide panorama of what the term “slum” hides, at a time when, in Morocco, the associative sector is mobilizing on the question of the right to life and therefore for the recognition in “new urban models” of shantytowns.

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